Although the Android system has been continuously hardened against side-channel attacks, there are still plenty of APIs available that can be exploited. However, most side-channel analyses in the literature consider specifically chosen APIs (or resources) in the Android framework, after a manual analysis of APIs for possible information leaks has been performed. Such a manual analysis is a tedious, time consuming, and error-prone task, meaning that information leaks tend to be overlooked.
INTRODUCTION
The exploitation of unintended information leaks on mobile devices, denoted as side-channel analysis, represents a vivid area of research. Mobile devices, in particular, Android-based devices, represent a popular target since these devices store and process Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. sensitive information. Among the different types of side-channel attacks [29] , software-based side-channel attacks constitute a powerful attack technique since these attacks can be conducted without the attacker being physically present with the targeted device, and attack applications can be spread easily via established app markets such as Google Play. In case of software-based sidechannel attacks, sensitive information unintentionally leaks to untrusted third-party applications (apps) via side channels. Such software-based side-channel attacks on mobile devices range from microarchitectural attacks [14, 26, 30, 31, 36] , via sensor-based attacks [6, 7, 11, 16, 20, 22, 23, 25] , to attacks exploiting the Android API and procfs resources [8, 10, 12, 13, 17, 24, 27, 28] .
Nevertheless, so far most side-channel analyses focused on the exploitation of manually chosen resources, such as sensors, or the exploitation of manually selected information leaks via specific resources within the procfs or the Android API. Only recently, a framework denoted as ProcHarvester [28] -that allows analyzing procfs resources for possible information leaks automatically-has been published. However, a similar approach for the Android framework (the Java-based Android API) is still missing but would be beneficial to complement the automatic assessment of information leaked through the Android API. Especially in light of the steadily increasing number of Android APIs introduced with every new API level, such automatic frameworks are of particular importance. In contrast to ProcHarvester [28] , where the side-channel assessment is based on numerical information read from procfs resources, assessing information leaks in the Android API requires the construction of objects and the invocation of methods with semantically correct parameters. Hence, the questions that we are addressing in this paper are: (1) how do we automatically identify information leaks in the Android API?, and (2) given specific events of interest, what information can be exploited to infer these events? To answer these questions, we need to address the following challenges.
(1) List of APIs. A selection of APIs, which are to be profiled for a specific Android API level, is required.
Approach:
We parse the official package index of the Android API to extract classes, methods, and corresponding parameters. (2) Valid Objects and Parameters. Valid objects must be created by passing meaningful parameters to constructors, and method calls require semantically meaningful parameters.
We aim for a mostly automated approach to select parameters for meaningful method calls, including object creation. Additionally, specific parameters can also be easily preconfigured to ensure semantically correct parameter values. (3) Profiling Framework. The profiling of dedicated events should be done automatically, i.e., the triggering of events as well as the profiling of methods on the mobile devices.
Approach: Based on the ProcHarvester framework [28] , which in turn relies on the Android Debug Bridge (ADB), we automatically trigger events and command the profiling phase.
(4) Analysis Framework. A framework to automatically analyze gathered information for possible side-channel leaks is required.
Approach: Based on the ProcHarvester framework [28] , which relies on dynamic time warping, we analyze the gathered information to assess possible information leaks. By solving these challenges and by extending ProcHarvester [28] , we come up with a framework denoted SCAnDroid that allows assessing information leaks within the Java-based Android API automatically. Thereby, we overcome the tedious task of manually analyzing the Android framework for side-channel leaks. Overall, we positively answer the motivating question: The automated profiling of the Android API framework for side-channel leaks is possible. The application of SCAnDroid on Android 8 (Android Oreo) revealed several new side-channel leaks. 1
Contributions. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) We propose a framework denoted SCAnDroid to assess side-channel leaks in the Android framework automatically.
(2) We demonstrate the applicability of SCAnDroid by automatically profiling various events of interest, such as website launches, Google Maps searches, and application starts. (3) Based on the above-outlined events of interest, we identify new side-channel leaks within the Android API.
Outline. In Section 2, we discuss background information and related work. In Section 3, we introduce the SCAnDroid framework. In Section 4, we showcase SCAnDroid by automatically assessing information leaks for various events. In Section 5, we discuss limitations and future work. In Section 6, we conclude this work.
BACKGROUND
Side-Channel Attacks. Software-based side-channel attacks on mobile devices exploit contention for shared resources, e.g., contention for CPU caches in case of microarchitectural attacks [14, 26, 30, 31, 36] , specific features or resources of the device, e.g., sensors in case of sensor-based attacks [6, 7, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 33] , or the Android Framework [27, 34, 37] and the procfs [8, 10, 12, 17, 24, 27, 28] . For a comprehensive overview about side-channel attacks on mobile devices we refer to [29] .
In this work, we are particularly interested in side-channel attacks on the Java-based Android framework level. Among these attacks are, for example, the work of Zhou et al. [37] , who exploited per-process network traffic statistics to infer activities within Twitter, WebMD, and Yahoo! Finance. Zhang et al. [34] exploited perprocess traffic statistics of a surveillance app that interacts with a surveillance video camera to infer when a user's home is empty. Spreitzer et al. [27] exploited per-process network statistics of browsers to infer visited websites. In response to these attacks, the TrafficStats.getUid[R|T]xBytes(<uid>) API has been hardened and cannot be queried anymore for network statistics of other processes since Android 7 (Android Nougat) [5] . Hence, these attacks do not work on more recent Android versions, such as Android 7 (Android Nougat) and Android 8 (Android Oreo), anymore. However, the question arises whether there exist other Java interfaces in the Android framework that enable similar attacks. 1 We responsibly disclosed our findings to Google. The SCAnDroid framework is available at: https://github.com/IAIK/SCAnDroid. Automated Analysis Frameworks. While the above discussed investigations consider the exploitation of manually chosen resources, approaches towards a more systematic side-channel evaluation are quite scarce. Only recently, the need for an automated analysis framework that allows identifying side-channel leaks in the procfs on Android-based mobile devices has been motivated [28] . Currently, ProcHarvester [28] is the only framework enabling an automated analysis of procfs information leaks on Android. While dedicated events of interest are being triggered on the device, ProcHarvester automatically reads numerical values from the procfs. The gathered values are then analyzed using machine-learning approaches to identify possible information leaks in these resources.
A similar framework to assess possible information leaks in the Android API itself does not exist. Compared to ProcHarvester, a significant challenge of such a framework is the invocation of constructors and methods with valid parameters.
Android Permission System. Specific features and resources on Android are protected by dedicated permissions. For resources outside of Android apps that are considered as being non-sensitive, so-called normal permissions [4] are required. Although these permissions need to be specified in the Android Manifest.xml, these permissions are granted to any application without requiring the user's consent. Hence, apps relying on normal permissions only are considered as zero-permission apps. Among these normal permissions is, for example, the INTERNET permission.
APIs and resources that are considered as sensitive require socalled dangerous permissions or even system-level permissions [4] . These permissions also need to be specified in the Android Manifest.xml, but unlike normal permissions, these permissions need to be explicitly granted by the user. In case of dangerous permissions, the user needs to grant these permissions through a pop-up dialog. System-level permissions need to be explicitly granted for specific apps via the settings menu and, thus, also require user consent.
Threat Model. The specific type of side-channel attacks that we are interested in are software-based side-channel attacks [29] , and in particular attacks on the Java-based Android API. These attacks typically consist of a training phase and an attack phase. In the training phase, the attacker models events of interest, e.g., the attacker builds templates for information leaks related to secret events. In the attack phase, the attacker distributes a malicious app, which in general does not require any permission (only normal permissions that are automatically granted without the user's consent). After the targeted user installed this malicious app, the app observes the previously identified information leaks (that can be accessed without any permission) and infers the corresponding events. SCAnDroid automatically identifies information leaks that can be exploited by such software-based side-channel attacks.
SCANDROID
SCAnDroid allows profiling events of interest in order to identify information leaks within the Android framework. Similar to ProcHarvester [28] , SCAnDroid builds on the concept of template attacks, a conventional and powerful attack technique for sidechannel analyses. In the first phase, (possibly) leaking information is modeled as templates for events of interest. In the second phase, it is tested whether or not the established models (templates) allow to infer the corresponding events based on the observed information leaks. Such template attacks enable automatic analysis since no background knowledge about the leaking information is required. Figure 1 illustrates the basic design of SCAnDroid. In the first step, the Parser component fetches a list of available constructors, and methods from the Android Developers website [3] , and parses this information in the second step to extract methods to be profiled. Furthermore, it extracts all permissions, including normal, dangerous, and system-level permissions. In the third step, the Controller component commands the smartphone to trigger events of interest, and the Controller also interacts with the SCAnDroid logging app on the smartphone. The SCAnDroid app on the smartphone relies on Java Reflections [15] to create objects according to the information retrieved from the Parser component and logs the corresponding methods in the fourth step. After the profiling has been finished, the Controller component fetches the gathered information in the fifth step. Finally, the Analyzer component analyzes the gathered information to identify information leaks in the sixth step.
The Analyzer and the Controller component are based on the ProcHarvester [28] framework. Subsequently, the working principle of each component is discussed in more detail.
Backend
Parser Component. Although Java Reflections allow to examine the Java API during runtime and, thus, to retrieve a list of available classes and methods at runtime, the semantics of parameter names cannot be retrieved dynamically on the device. That is, only the type of a parameter and a generic name are available, e.g., int method(int arg 0 ), but the parameter name (which often reflects the meaning and purpose of the parameter) is not available. For example, in contrast to an abstract parameter name arg 0 , the meaning of long time or int uid can be inferred easily. Hence, we parse the Android Developer documentation [3] to establish a list of constructors and methods, including the corresponding parameters, i.e., their type and name information. Based on this list, we extract methods of interest with a specific prefix. The method prefixes that are currently being considered as relevant are: get, has, is, and query. We focus on these prefixes since so-called accessor methods-used to access encapsulated member variables in object-oriented programming languages such as Java-are typically prefixed with these keywords.
Furthermore, the parser component extracts all permissions, which allow us to analyze information leaks according to the three permission groups: (1) zero-permission apps, (2) dangerous permission apps, and (3) system-level permission apps [4] . Of particular interest in the context of software-based side-channel attacks are information leaks that can be exploited by zero-permission apps, i.e., apps that only require normal permissions.
Controller Component. The Controller component interacts with the SCAnDroid app on the smartphone to command the profiling via the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) [1], e.g., to start and stop the logging process on the device. Furthermore, the controller programmatically triggers events of interest on the connected smartphone. Currently, SCAnDroid supports triggering website launches, Google Maps search queries, and application starts, but SCAnDroid can be easily extended to support further events. The list of events is by no means exhaustive. It is only intended to demonstrate the working principle of SCAnDroid. After all events of interest have been triggered, the controller fetches the gathered information for further analysis.
Analyzer Component. The time series gathered for one method and one triggered event forms a so-called trace, and the Analyzer component analyzes these time series using machine learning. Therefore, it relies on dynamic time warping (DTW), 2 which aims to find a warping path with minimal distance between two time series, and the Python framework scikit-learn [21] . The appealing benefit of dynamic time warping is that it allows to compare time series of different lengths, and also to identify similarities in time series that vary in speed. Thus, DTW identifies similarities even if the information is misaligned, stretched, or compressed (cf. [19, 32] ).
Before the actual processing, all traces are normalized by subtracting the mean. All traces are combined in the so-called training data T = {(e i ,t i )}, which holds tuples of events (labels) e i and their corresponding time series t i . To evaluate whether a specific resource leaks information, we rely on k-fold cross validation. Hence, we split the training data T = {(e i ,t i )} into k folds, take each fold T f = {(e i ,t i )} (one at a time) and compute the warping paths between all tuples in this fold and all remaining tuples in the training data T \ T f . Let us denote the tuple with the minimal warping path between t i and t j as (e j ,t j ). If e i equals e j , then the event has been inferred correctly. The ratio of correctly inferred events and the total number of traces in the current fold T f indicates the inference accuracy, which represents a metric for information leakage. The higher the inference accuracy, the more accurate events can be inferred and, thus the more information leaks. To obtain a robust inference accuracy, we average the resulting inference accuracies over all folds, which is the usual approach of k-fold cross validation. We consider an API to leak information if the inference accuracy is better than randomly guessing the corresponding event.
Although we also tried to automatically extract dedicated features from the time series using tsfresh [9] , and to train (more sophisticated) supervised classifiers, the classification results were not that promising. In our experiments, DTW seems to yield the best results in terms of an automated information leakage analysis.
Smartphone Service
SCAnDroid App. The profiling of methods of interest is done in an Android app (a background service) on the mobile device or an emulator, similar to the ProcHarvester [28] framework. Compared to ProcHarvester, the actual profiling, however, requires more engineering effort and significantly more pre-processing since SCAnDroid needs to create objects and to invoke methods dynamically, instead of reading numerical information from procfs resources.
Listing 1 indicates the approach to inspect Java APIs during runtime. More specifically, Java Reflections allow inspecting available packages as well as classes. For each class, Java Reflections further allow retrieving constructors, to create objects, as well as to inspect and invoke methods on these objects. Inspecting the full Android API using Java Reflections, however, requires a significant amount of information (e.g., about classes, constructors, methods, and their corresponding parameters). Thus, inspecting the whole API at once is a memory intensive task, which requires more RAM than what might be available on today's mobile devices.
Listing 1: Inspecting Java APIs using Java Reflections. Recursion Flattening. To cope with this memory intensive task, we split the total number of packages in the Android API into several parts. For example, in case of our Nexus 5X with 2 GB of RAM, we split the Android API into four parts, which allows us to perform this step without running out of memory. Now, each of these four parts is inspected and prepared as depicted in Listing 1.
To improve performance and to enable profiling at all, we flatten the recursive call hierarchy. More specifically, for all methods of interest and their corresponding objects (which are required to invoke the methods of interest), we perform the following step: Invoke obj.method(...) and process the return value as follows.
• If it returns primitive data types, such as boolean and numerical values-either as primitive data type, in an array, or in a collection of a subclass of java.util.Collection (e.g, ArrayList)-the method and the corresponding object are stored (in a flattened list) to be invoked during the profiling step later on.
• If it returns an Object, recursively invoke methods of interest on this Object and repeat processing the return value(s) until the pre-defined recursion depth is reached. For the recursion flattening step, the configuration file allows specifying two parameters. First, the recursion depth is currently set to 2, which is a trade-off between performance (overall runtime and memory consumption), and exhaustiveness (coverage) of analyzed methods. Second, it allows specifying classes for which the corresponding objects (used to invoke a method of interest) should be re-generated before each method invocation. For example, we specified that NetworkStats.Bucket should be re-generated every time methods of interest in this class are invoked, i.e., we invoke each method of interest on a new object.
Parameter Selection. Although the SCAnDroid app generates random parameters for most method invocations, the corresponding parameters of constructors and methods can also be manually analyzed in terms of their semantics to provide meaningful values, e.g., in case of start and end times or storage UUIDs. In general, we follow a trial and error approach to choose parameters for constructor and method invocations. That is, in the first place, SCAnDroid randomly chooses parameters. If object creation or method invocation fails, e.g., due to an exception, we manually analyze the resulting errors and thrown exceptions to pre-configure parameters where random parameter selection seems to be the problem. Besides static parameter values, such as specific start or end times, SCAnDroid also supports dynamic parameter generation as well as array-type parameters. For example, in case of a time stamp, "System.currentTimeMillis()+10" could be specified as parameter value for specific methods, which are evaluated before the actual method invocation. Array-type parameters can be specified in case a particular method or constructor should be invoked multiple times with different parameters. In total, we defined 73 values, including array-type parameters, for 11 parameter names.
Pre-Profiling. After the objects and methods to be called as well as the corresponding parameters have been acquired, events are triggered continuously while the prepared methods are invoked simultaneously. If the returned value of a method changes at least once during two event triggering phases, we consider the corresponding method in the subsequent profiling phase. This allows - us to significantly reduce the set of actual methods to be profiled, as the majority of methods do not react while events are being triggered. Overall, this pre-profiling step identifies methods that possibly leak information and, thus, should be profiled in the next step to assess possible information leaks.
Profiling. The actual profiling is the least intensive step in terms of computations and memory consumption. The corresponding methods are continuously invoked, while the events are being triggered simultaneously on the device via the backend. The returned values of these methods are gathered in dedicated files, which will be analyzed by the Analyzer component in the backend later on.
Performance. On our test device, it takes about 7-8 hours for the whole API (all four parts) to be processed. The most intensive part is the pre-profiling step, which prepares the methods to be profiled. The actual profiling depends on the number of events to be triggered and the profiling time for each event. For example, in case of triggering websites, we consider 20 websites, 8 samples per website, a profiling time of 10 seconds, and a cool-down period of 2 seconds between two events, 3 resulting in a profiling time of 20 · 8 · (10 + 2) = 1 920 s, i.e., about half an hour. The subsequent k-fold cross validation based on DTW takes about one minute. Table 2 depicts the configurations of our test device. Besides performing the side-channel assessment, we also use this device to investigate the coverage of profiled Android APIs by SCAnDroid, which is indicated in Table 1 . Interestingly, according to Java Reflections, the number of methods available (53 913) is larger than the number of methods documented in the Android API (36 339 ). This is due to the fact that Java Reflections allow inspecting private and protected methods, which are, in general, not documented as they are only available within a specific class or package, respectively.
Coverage Analysis
As mentioned above, we consider methods to be of interest, if they are prefixed with a specific keyword, such as get, has, is, or query. Out of the 12 012 public methods that we consider as being relevant, 2 860 methods are defined in abstract classes or interfaces and, thus, cannot be invoked directly. For 3 664 non-static methods, 3 These parameters are chosen similar to other website fingerprint attacks [12, 27] . a corresponding object could not be created, e.g., due to exceptions while creating the object, missing constructors, or because parameter construction fails. For 208 methods, the corresponding class required to call the method could not be found, e.g., in the packages android.test, and junit.runner. 511 methods have been removed due to segmentation faults in the underlying native libraries (mostly inside the android.graphics package). 692 methods crash during the profiling, e.g., they throw an exception due to a missing permission or an incorrect parameter and are thus not considered in the side-channel assessment. In theory, SCAnDroid should thus be able to cover about 4 077 methods of interest, i.e., 33.9% of the relevant methods. However, due to the recursive approach followed by SCAnDroid, we also use objects returned by recursive method invocations to further increase the coverage to 5 056 methods of interest (42.1%). For example, Context.getSystemService(...) returns NetworkStats objects, which cannot be created directly.
We profiled these 5 056 methods while triggering events of interest, i.e., website launches, Google Maps queries, and app starts. The list of websites, apps, and points of interests (POIs) used for the evaluations are given in Appendix A. Table 1 also shows that many methods do not react while events are being triggered. Hence, the information returned from these methods (probably) cannot be exploited. Although the information might not be exploitable directly, another side-channel leak might still exist. For example, a timing variation for different events or parameters might be observable. This particular case is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
Our experiment also revealed that 1 096 public methods, which we consider relevant for side-channel analysis, e.g., prefixed with get, has, is or query, have been added in Android 8.0 (Android Oreo). This increasing number of APIs also stresses the importance of an automatic approach to assess possible information leaks. 
CASE STUDIES
In this section, we demonstrate the applicability of SCAnDroid by automatically analyzing the Android API for possible information leaks in various attack scenarios.
Website Fingerprinting
The idea of website fingerprinting attacks is to observe side-channel information on mobile devices and to determine the websites a user navigates to. Such attacks represent a severe privacy threat as has been argued in [12, 27] . To assess possible information leaks in the Android API that allow conducting such website fingerprinting attacks, we automatically launch websites in the browser application and simultaneously profile the Android API in the background. Similar to [12, 27] , we considered a profiling duration of 10 seconds for each website and gathered 8 samples (time series) per website.
Normal Permissions (Zero-Permission Apps). Table 3 The java.util.UUID required by the StorageStatsManager and StorageManager API represents a 128-bit ID identifying the storage volume. This parameter has been set in the configuration file in order to provide a meaningful parameter. Interestingly, these APIs have been added in Android 8 (Android Oreo) and, thus, represent new information leaks introduced in the latest Android version.
While the network statistics provided via the TrafficStats API might be considered as more obvious information leaks, the information leaks via the File API are more subtle. More specifically, the API File.getUsableSpace() reports the number of bytes available to non-root users, and File.getFreeSpace() reports the number of bytes available to root users [2] . To the best of our knowledge, there is no study yet discussing the possibility to infer visited websites based on these APIs. Even if an inference accuracy of about 40% for the API java.io.File.getUsableSpace() seems to be quite moderate, randomly guessing the correct website out of a set of 20 websites yields an accuracy of 1 20 = 5%. Thus, SCAnDroid clearly identified an information leak. Figure 2 illustrates traces for three of the identified information leaks for amazon.com and reddit.com. We observe similarities between traces for the same website and differences between different websites. SCAnDroid successfully detected the corresponding information leaks using DTW. Experiments on Android 7 (Android Nougat) revealed similar results and have been omitted.
Top N Metric. A more conservative metric to identify information leaks is to consider the accuracy when taking the top N results returned from the classifier into consideration, which is illustrated in Figure 3 . If we consider the top 3 websites returned from the classifier based on DTW, we achieve an inference accuracy of more than 60% for these information leaks. Furthermore, we observe that all information leaks significantly outperform random guessing.
Dangerous and System-Level Permissions. Considering APIs that require dangerous permissions, SCAnDroid also identified APIs that can be exploited to conduct side-channel attacks. Table 4 depicts the identified information leaks that allow website fingerprinting on Android 8.1 (Android Oreo) when launching websites in Google Chrome 64. We provide these results here for the sake of completeness only since these resources cannot be exploited by zero-permission apps.
In order to retrieve a NetworkStats.Bucket object, SCAnDroid invoked NetworkStatsManager.querySummaryForDevice(. . . ) with parameters int networkType, String subscriberId, long startTime, and long endTime. Querying this method requires the PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS (system-level) permission, and the parameters have been pre-configured in the configuration file. For instance, networkType has been set to TYPE_MOBILE, subscriberId has been set to "TelephonyManager.getSubscriberId()", which in turn requires the READ_PHONE_STATE (dangerous) permission, startTime has been set to System.currentTimeMillis(), and endTime has been set to "System.currentTimeMillis()+100", respectively. This example demonstrates that SCAnDroid is able to handle complex method invocations. We verified the information leaks by manually launching the 20 websites in the browser and monitoring the identified information leaks in the background. As shown in Appendix B, the identified APIs also leak in case of manually triggering the event.
Google Maps Search Inference
Inspired by Zhang et al. [35] , who suggested to infer search queries in Apple Maps by exploiting side-channel information, we consider such a scenario on Android. Such an attack allows zero-permission apps to infer what places a user might want to visit or what places the user is interested. Again, to automatically assess possible information leaks in the Android API, we automatically search for various POIs in Google Maps and simultaneously profile the Android API for 15 seconds in the background.
Normal Permissions (Zero-Permission Apps). Table 5 depicts the identified information leaks for inferring Google Maps search queries on Android 8.1 (Android Oreo). The accuracy has been evaluated for 20 POIs around the world, and 8 samples per POI. Again, the TrafficStats API reporting global network traffic statistics allows inferring these events with a high accuracy. Although java.io.File.getUsableSpace() achieves an accuracy of 10.6% only, it still represents an information leak since randomly guessing would result in an accuracy of 1 20 = 5%. Figure 4 illustrates traces for three of the identified information leaks when querying Google Maps for Eiffel Tower and The Great Wall, respectively. For TrafficStats.getMobileRxBytes() and TrafficStats.getMobileTxBytes() we observe similarities between traces for the same POI and differences between the two POIs. However, while the time series of File.getUsableSpace() for The Great Wall seem to be correlated, the time series for the Eiffel Tower only share a few peaks and patterns, which decreases the accuracy. Nevertheless, exploiting this API by matching gathered time series with DTW still outperforms random guessing attacks. Figure 5 illustrates the inference accuracy when considering the top N results returned from the classifier. Again, all information leaks outperform random guessing attacks.
Dangerous and System-Level Permissions. Table 6 depicts the identified information leaks that allow inferring Google Maps searches on Android 8.1 (Android Oreo) when considering apps that request dangerous permissions. Thus, these resources cannot be exploited by zero-permission apps. The NetworkStats.Bucket object has been retrieved as described in Section 4.1. 
Application Start Inference
The idea of app start inference attacks is to observe side-channel information in order to learn currently executed applications on a mobile device. Currently executed apps represent sensitive information as this information enables targeted attacks, such as stealing login credentials [8] . Therefore, since Android 5 (Android Lollipop) the list of running apps cannot be retrieved by third-party applications anymore. Still by exploiting side-channel information from the procfs [10, 28] it is possible to infer running applications. Again, in order to assess possible information leaks in the Android API, we automatically start applications and simultaneously profile the Android API for 8 seconds in the background.
Normal Permissions (Zero-Permission Apps). Table 7 depicts the identified information leaks for application cold starts on Android 8.1 (Android Oreo). The accuracy has been evaluated for 20 apps and 8 samples per app. Again, global network statistics allow inferring application cold starts with a high accuracy.
Top N Metric. Figure 6 indicates the inference accuracy when considering the top N results returned from the classifier. Again, this plot demonstrates that the identified information leaks outperform random guessing attacks. Dangerous and System-Level Permissions. Table 8 depicts the identified information leaks that allow inferring application starts on Android 8.1 (Android Oreo) when considering apps that request dangerous permissions. Thus, these resources cannot be exploited by zero-permission apps. The NetworkStats.Bucket object has been retrieved as described in Section 4.1.
DISCUSSION
Limitations. Similar to the limitations of ProcHarvester [28] , SCAnDroid also suffers from false negatives. That is, even though SCAnDroid does not report an information leak for a specific event and a specific API level, this does not guarantee that there are indeed no information leaks present. However, automated analysis tools always aim to generalize the detection of information leaks and, thus, possibly suffer from false negatives.
Countermeasures. We believe that an automated tool such as SCAnDroid represents a valuable tool for OS developers to test whether or not a newly introduced API interface leaks sensitive information. Thereby, identified information leaks could be prevented in the first place, i.e., before the corresponding API interfaces are released. Currently, it seems that side-channel leaks on the API level need to be addressed on the OS level. For example, by restricting access to these APIs or by releasing more coarse-grained information in case of some statistics.
More generic approaches such as App Guardian [34] that aim to detect ongoing side-channel attacks by monitoring side-channel information of currently executed applications represent an interesting approach to cope with software-based side-channel attacks. However, App Guardian relies on resources that have been restricted in newer Android versions and, thus, this approach needs to be constantly updated in order to deal with these restrictions.
Future Work. As the application of SCAnDroid demonstrated, the Android API exposes many exploitable interfaces that enable side-channel attacks, even on the latest Android 8 (Android Oreo). However, considering the complexity of the Java-based Android API, there is still room for improvement for automatic frameworks such as SCAnDroid. For instance, to further increase the coverage of the analyzed Android framework, SCAnDroid could be extended to support Android-specific callback interfaces. More specifically, Android handles sensor events via so-called listeners. Thereby, an app registers sensor-event listeners that get notified in case of sensor updates. Currently, such listener APIs are not covered by SCAnDroid.
In addition, as our coverage analysis in Section 3.3 revealed, there are still a few hundred methods left that have not been profiled so far. Especially Java interfaces that call native libraries, e.g., in case of the android.graphics package, crash due to segmentation faults. These faults require further analysis in order to determine why these interfaces crash, and whether or not these interfaces can be profiled by specifying pre-configured parameters in the configuration file (instead of randomly chosen parameters). For example, it might be possible that the parameters chosen by SCAnDroid are outside of a defined range, which causes the method to crash. Nevertheless, with a coverage of about 42.1% of all public methods that are prefixed with get, has, is, and query, several new information leaks have been detected in the Android API.
As already mentioned in Section 3.3, a method might expose a different timing behavior due to different input parameters or due to different events being triggered. For example, on iOS it has been shown [35] that the fileExistsAtPath API yields a different timing depending on whether or not the passed file exists, even if the running app is not allowed to read the file. Future work should possibly consider the extension of automated frameworks to cover such information leaks as well.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced SCAnDroid, a framework to automatically assess the Java-based Android API for possible side-channel leaks. To enable such an automatic assessment of side-channel leaks in the Android framework, we had to tackle the challenge of dealing with the variety of Java APIs.
The need for a framework such as SCAnDroid arises from the observation that manual analysis of side-channel information leaks is tedious and error-prone, i.e., information leaks tend to be overlooked, especially in case of very subtle information leaks. Thus, we argue that automated frameworks for such tasks are inevitable. First, to investigate existing APIs and to fix identified information leaks and, second, to identify information leaks of APIs upfront.
We demonstrated the applicability of SCAnDroid in practice by considering various side-channel attacks-already known from manual investigations in the literature-and we identified several information leaks automatically. These findings clearly underline the effectiveness of our chosen approach. Especially network traffic statistics-even though published only globally since Android 7 (Android Nougat)-represent sensitive information that allows inferring most of the triggered events rather accurately. Mostly because smartphones are connected to the Internet all the time, and heavily rely on Internet connectivity to provide the desired functionality. Hence, the publication of such statistics must be reconsidered.
Overall we believe that SCAnDroid advances the API-based side-channel analysis on mobile devices and hopefully helps to prevent various information leaks in the first place. Table 12 depicts the verified information leaks of manually launched websites. The evaluation has been performed with the same set of 20 websites as listed in Table 9 . The identified information leaks are the same as the ones revealed during the automatic evaluation in Section 4.1.
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